I am posting these summaries on a delay because I spent yesterday at Legoland in Florida with my family. While I was strolling through Bricksburg and riding a Duplo block safari truck, the Mississippi Supreme Court unleashed 126 pages of opinions in just four cases. Only one decision was unanimous and the others were 7-2, 5-4, and 5-4, each of which drew thoughtful dissents.
The more contentious cases were a death penalty post-conviction claim, a case of first impression applying the federal vacatur rule, and a decision addressing the limitations period in a thorny implied indemnity case.
Jones v. State, 2021-KA-00275-SCT (Criminal – Felony/Manslaughter)
Affirming conviction for manslaughter, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by not requiring the jury to specify whether its verdict was based on heat of passion or imperfect self-defense because those are both factual theories encompassed within section 97-3-35, (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and (3) dispersing the jury for lunch was within the circuit court’s discretion and no timely request to sequester was made.
(All participating justices concurred.)
Batiste v. State, 2019-CA-00283-SCT (en banc) (Civil – Death Penalty – Post Conviction/Recusal/Gladney)
Affirming the circuit court’s denial of Bastiste’s motion for recusal based on an argument that the circuit judge’s memory of an alleged conversation with a juror could be relied on in witness-credibility determinations while evaluating the underlying PRC claim and denying the underlying PCR claim, holding (1) that it was speculation that the judge might be a necessary witness in the case, (2) that the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel did not even attempt to follow the appropriate method for post-verdict juror inquiry laid out in Gladney, and (3) that Batiste’s Six Amendment right to an impartial jury was not violated when the circuit court determined that discussions of the racial composition of the jury were brought about within the jury itself rather than from an extraneous source.
(Justice Kitchens wrote a dissent, joined by Justice King.)
Gamma Healthcare Inc. v. Estate of Grantham, 2019-CT-00913-SCT (en banc) (Civil – Workers’ Comp)
Affirming the Court of Appeals’ decisions dismissing the case as moot following the untimely death of the claimant, applying federal vacatur rule and vacating the MWCC’s orders to replace the claimant’s septic and HVAC systems, and reversing the MWCC’s award of sanctions.
The vacatur issue was one of first impression in Mississippi. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision included the following excerpt from the U.S. Supreme Court on the vacatur standard:
The United States Supreme Court has held that:
Gamma Healthcare, Inc. v. Estate of Grantham, 2019-CT-00913-SCT at ¶15 (Miss. 2022).
When a civil case becomes moot pending appellate adjudication, “[t]he
established practice . . . in the federal system . . . is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.” United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S. Ct. 104, 106, 95 L. Ed. 36 (1950). . . . Vacatur is in order when mootness occurs through happenstance—circumstance not attributable to the parties—or, . . . , the “unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court.” U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 513 U.S., at 23, 115 S. Ct., at 390; cf. id., at 29, 115 S. Ct., at 393 (“mootness by reason of settlement [ordinarily] does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review”).
Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71-72, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1071, 137 L. Ed.2d 170 (1997) (emphasis added) (first, second, and fifth alterations in original). “Because this practice is rooted in equity, the decision whether to vacate turns on ‘the conditions and circumstances of the particular case.’” Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1792, 201 L. Ed. 2d 118 (2018) (quoting United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U.S. 466, 478, 36 S. Ct. 212, 60 L. Ed. 387 (1916)). The Supreme Court also has held that:
The point of vacatur is to prevent an unreviewable decision “from spawning any legal consequences,” so that no party is harmed by what we have called a “preliminary” adjudication. Munsingwear, 340 U.S., at 40-41, 71 S. Ct. 104. . . . When happenstance prevents that review from occurring, the normal rule should apply: Vacatur then rightly “strips the decision below of its binding effect,” Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 200, 108 S. Ct. 523, 98 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1988), and “clears the path for future relitigation,” Munsingwear, 340 U.S., at 40, 71 S. Ct. 104.
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 713, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2035, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1118 (2011).
(Justice Randolph wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Coleman, Justice Ishee, and Justice Griffis.)
Cooley v. Pine Belt Oil Co., Inc., 2019-IA-01835-SCT (en banc) (Civil – Implied Indemnity)
Reversing, on interlocutory appeal, the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on an indemnity claim and rendering judgment in favor of the defendant. Long before this litigation commenced, MDEQ ordered the two sides of this dispute to remediate a gasoline line leak on March 5, 2009. Pine Belt, the landowner, paid for the remediation. Then, in 2015, Pine Belt retained an expert who opined that the leak occurred when the property was owned by the Cooleys.
On April 15, 2016, Pine Belt filed a complaint for implied indemnity against the Cooleys seeking to recover the remediation expenses that Pine Belt incurred in response to MDEQ’s order. The Cooleys filed a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and Pine Belt argued that an implied indemnity claim cannot accrue before a liability party can be identified and because there must be a final, fixed amount. The circuit court denied the motion. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal, reversed the circuit court, and rendered judgment in favor of Pine Belt. The Mississippi Supreme Court specifically held that the statute of limitations began to run when MDEQ ordered the remediation:
Although the amount that Pine Belt was ordered to pay by MDEQ was unliquidated, the MDEQ order legally obligated Pine Belt to pay for present and future cleanup costs which Pine Belt all along believed, in fairness, should be paid by the Cooleys. Because the order placed Pine Belt under a compulsion to pay damages which it believed should be paid by another, this Court finds that all of the elements of implied indemnity were present and the statute of limitations began to run on March 5, 2009, and ended on March 5, 2012. Pine Belt did not file its complaint until April 15, 2016. Thus, Pine Belt’s implied indemnity action is time barred.
Cooley v. Pine Belt Oil Co., Inc., 2019-IA-01835 ¶29 (Miss. 2022) (emphasis added).
(Chief Justice Randolph wrote a partial concurrence, partial dissent, joined by Justice Coleman, Justice Maxwell, and Justice Ishee.)
Other Orders
Grayson v. State, 1998-DP-01782-SCT (denying pro se motion to withdraw motion to carry out execution forthwith)
Powers v. State, 2017-DR-696-SCT (granting motion to seal exhibits from public, but not from opposing counsel)
Fluker v. State, 2020-CT-791-SCT (denying pro se petition for writ of certiorari)
Fields v. State, 2020-KA-1317-SCT (denying motion for rehearing)
